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#2A-5/8/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF WHITE PLAINS. 
Respondent:. 
-and- CASE NO. U-7 326 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC.. WHITE PLAINS UNIT. LOCAL 860. 
Charging Party. 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (BERTRAND B. POGREBIN. ESQ. 
and JOHN A. RENO. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Respondent 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH. P.C. (WILLIAM M. WALLENS. 
ESQ. and JOHN R. MINEAUX. ESQ.. of Counsel), for 
Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc.. White Plains Unit. Local 860, 
(CSEA). It alleges that the City of White Plains (City) 
committed an improper practice by unilaterally designating 
Mehrman. a Principal Stenographer - Department of Law. as 
a confidential employee. 
In 1981. the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) had designated Marcionni. an 
Administrative Assistant, as confidential on the ground 
Board - U-7326 
that she worked for Grant, the Senior Assistant 
Corporation Counsel, who was a member of the City's team 
in collective negotiations, and was privy to the City's 
conduct of negotiations. When Marcionni retired. Mehrman, 
a senior legal stenographer, was promoted to Marcionni's 
position, the title of which was changed to Principal 
Stenographer - Department of Law. 
The record establishes that the City designated 
Mehrman confidential unilaterally rather than seeking such 
a designation by PERB. It further establishes that 
principal stenographers are in the negotiating unit, and 
"Mehrman performs the identical duties as were previously 
performed by Marcionni and were found by the Director to 
be confidential". 
On these facts, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
concluded that the City violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of 
the Taylor Law and she ordered the City, inter alia, to 
negotiate with CSEA regarding Mehrman's terms and 
conditions of employment. In doing so. she said: 
The conclusion sought by the City 
might be obtained if Merhrman had replaced 
Marcionni as Administrative Assistant, or 
if Marcionni's title had changed to 
Principal Stenographer, all while 
performing the same duties; here, however, 
there have been two cuangesi a different 
employee and the establishment of a new 
position, not a civil service 
reclassification of the old position, 
(footnote omitted) 
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The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of the 
City. It argues that the decision "glorifies form over 
substance" because, on the record evidence. Mehrman is a 
confidential employee. 
The issues raised, by this matter are new. We have 
had occasion to determine that it is the actual 
responsibilities of employees rather than their job titles 
which determine whether they should be designated 
managerial or confidential.— This supports the 
proposition, articulated by the ALJ. that the change in 
the job title from Administrative Assistant to Principal 
Stenographer - Department of Law. does not vacate the 
designation of that position as confidential. We have 
not, however, had occasion to consider whether the 
designation of an individual as managerial or confidential 
expires when the person so designated leaves that 
position, or whether it applies to successor employees who 
perform the identical duties. Confronting that guestion 
for the first time, we conclude that the designation 
applies to such successor employees. 
The logic of our decision in City of Binqhamton. 
supra, dictates that it is the nature of the duties and 
1/citv of Binqhamton, 10 PERB V3038 (1977). 
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responsibilities performed, or to be performed, which 
determines whether a managerial or confidential designation 
should be made. It follows that the identity of the person 
performing those duties is no more the determinitive factor 
than is the particular title of the person performing those 
duties. 
The ALJ. too. has ruled that the identity of the 
employee performing the relevant responsibilities is not 
dispositive of the issue. However, while she ruled that 
neither a change in the identity of the employee or of the 
job title would separately terminate a designation, she 
held that the two changes made simultaneously would do so. 
Section 201.7(a) of the Taylor Law speaks of the 
designation of employees as managerial or confidential and 
not of titles or of responsibilities. It may, therefore, 
be argued that only the individual so designated is 
managerial or confidential, and that each time a designated 
employee leaves his position a new application must be made 
for the designation of his successor. This would impose an 
unduly onerous burden upon public employers. Not only 
would it require repetitive litigation, but it would also 
unreasonably compel public employers to deal periodically with 
employee organizations with respect to the terms and conditions 
of employment of employees performing the same managerial or 
„- 96^  
Board - U-7326 
confidential functions. Each time a managerial or 
confidential employee is replaced, the public employer 
would have to await the appropriate opportunity to file an 
2/ 
application for the designation of his successor.— 
Thereafter, the designation, once made, would not take 
effect until the period of unchallenged representation of 
3/ the employee organization expires.— 
We find that the language of §201.7(a) of the Taylor 
Law which refers to the designation of "employees" as 
managerial or confidential does not preclude the 
continuing application of such designations to the 
successors of the designated "employees" who perform the 
same responsibilities. The statutory language providing 
for the designation of "employees" flows from the 
provisions of §202 and §203 of the Taylor Law which gives 
rights of organization and representation to "employees". 
It is, therefore, natural that preclusion from those 
rights by virtue of managerial or confidential status 
should be articulated in terms of "employees". 
^Section 210.10(b) of the Rules of this Board 
permits such applications during the fourth and fifth 
months of the fiscal year of the public employer. 
^Section 201.7(a) of the Taylor Law. See, for 
example. Wappinqer CSD. 16 PERB ir3029 (1983). in which a 
public employer committed an improper practice by acting 
unilaterally with respect to an employee who had been 
designated confidential instead of waiting 25 months until 
the end of the employee organization's period of 
unchallenged representation. 
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Accordingly, we hold that such a designation, once made, 
applies thereafter to managerial or confidential employees 
who perform those duties which were the basis of the 
original designation. 
Of course, nothing herein is intended to suggest that 
where a designation is based on a variety of duties which, 
taken together, constitute managerial or confidential 
wort, the assignment of some of those duties to a 
successor employee would be sufficient for an automatic 
extension of the designation to such a successor. Here, 
however, the record establishes that the duties of Merhman 
were identical with those of Marcionni which were found to 
be confidential. We further note that nothing here 
indicates that the title. Principal Stenographer, is a 
confidential position. There are principal stenographers 
other than Merhman in the negotiating unit and they 
continue to be in that unit. There is no claim here that 
the City is not negotiating with CSEA concerning those 
positions. However, notwithstanding her title. Merhman 
has responsibilities that are unique to her, and it is by 
reason of those unique responsibilities that she is a 
4/ 
confidential employee.— 
1/Accord. Ellenville CSD. 16 PERB 1f3066 (1983). 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE REVERSE the decision Of the ALJ 
and WE ORDER that the charge herein 
be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATEDT May 8. 198 5 
Albany. New York 
•C^S*<^ ££*-
Harold R. Newman, Chairman ^ 
U4XZ 
David C. Randies, Membe 
#2B-5/8/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
- a n d - CASETSTOT U-74155 
NASSAU CHAPTER. CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. LOCAL 830. 
AFSCME, LOCAL 1000, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
EDWARD G. McCABE. ESQ. (BEE & DE ANGELIS. ESQS.. of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C. (CLAUDIA R. 
McKENNA, ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of both the 
Nassau Chapter, Civil Service Employees Association, Local 
830. AFSCME. Local 1000. AFL-CIO (CSEA) and the County of 
Nassau (County) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ). The decision dismissed a charge of CSEA alleging that 
the County unilaterally imposed a requirement upon "employees 
who call in 'sick' on Saturday and/or Sunday . . . that they 
. . . make up the missed day or days on another weekend." 
The employees involved work at the County's A. Holly 
Patterson Home for the aged and infirm. These employees are 
normally scheduled to work on alternate weekends. 
a- 9656 
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CSEA and the County were parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement for the period from January 1, 1982 
through December 31, 1984, which provided for paid sick 
leave. The County was concerned about a perceived abuse of 
sick leave on weekends. It therefore instituted a procedure 
whereby an employee taking sick leave over a weekend would be 
required to make up the time on a subsequent weekend when he 
was not scheduled to work. However, since the employee was 
contractually entitled to sick leave, he would be given 
compensatory time off on week days. CSEA complained that the 
unilateral institution of this procedure violated §209-a.l(d) 
1/ 
of the Taylor Law.-
The ALJ dismissed the charge on the ground that the 
parties agreement authorized the County "to regulate work 
schedules". She ruled that this clause constituted a waiver 
of CSEA's right to negotiate the rescheduling of the work. 
CSEA excepts to this decision. It contends that the ALJ 
misconstrued the change as one primarily involving 
scheduling, instead of considering its essence as being a 
change in sick leave procedures. In this connection it 
i'The charge also complained that the County refused 
to negotiate the impact of its unilateral action. The ALJ 
dismissed this specification of the charge on the basis of 
her finding that the County had indicated its willingness 
and availability to engage in such negotiations, and that 
the CSEA had never submitted any impact demands. There are 
no exceptions to this part of the ALJ's decision. 
Board - U-7455 
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asserts that the scheduling clause relied upon by the ALJ 
referred to permanent changes in schedules or shifts. Thus, 
according to CSEA, the above-quoted language of the 
collective bargaining agreement is not relevant to its 
charge. It further contends that, in any event, the contract 
provisions do not constitute an intentional relinquishment of 
a known right, and therefore are not a waiver within the 
meaning of CSEA v. Newman, et al„, 88 A.D.2d 685. 686, 15 
PERB ir7011 (3d Dept. 1982). app. dism'd. 57 N.Y.2d 775. 15 
PERB ir7020 (1982) . 
We reject CSEA's arguments. While the change instituted 
by the County was designed to curtail sick leave abuse, the 
manner in which it did so was through the regulation of work 
schedules, a matter reserved to the County by contract. The 
fact that the scheduling changes were temporary does not 
weaken this conclusion. The collective bargaining agreement 
provides: "No employee shall be required to work a shift 
which differs from his assigned shift, without two weeks 
written notice prior to the change, except in case of 
emergency". This provision indicates that, having satisfied 
the two-week notice requirement, the County could make both 
2 temporary and permanent changes in the employees' schedules.—' 
^/Having so found, we do not reach the County's 
argument that the collective bargaining agreement's 
coverage of sick leave was so thorough as to constitute 
complete satisfaction of its duty to negotiate that subject. 
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We also affirm the ALJ's conclusion that CSEA v. 
Newman, supra, does not preclude a finding of waiver. In 
addition to her stated reasons, which we endorse, we note 
that CSEA v. Newman deals with the situation in which a 
union arguably waives its right to negotiate a subject by 
agreeing not to negotiate that subject. This is 
distinguishable from the instant case which involves a 
situation where a union waives its right to negotiate a 
subject further because it has already negotiated that 
subject. 
In its cross-exceptions, the County, albeit not seeking 
any change in the outcome of the case, argues that its 
unilateral action involved a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation because its purpose was to control sick leave 
abuse. Our most relevant decision on this point is City of 
Rochester. 12 PERB ir3010 (1979). in which we found a union 
demand involving sick leave not to be a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. We said (at p. 3018): "Although the subject 
of sick leave is a mandatory subject of negotiation, a 
demand that the employer relinquish to unit employees alone 
all control of abuses in the taking of sick leave is not." 
There is no question of relinquishment of all control here. 
Rather the County's action involves the rescheduling of 
work in order to discourage sick leave abuse, and such 
rescheduling of work is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
96 
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The County next argues that the action it took is 
covered by the contract. The ALJ agreed, that being her 
reason for dismissing the charge. Accordingly, there is no 
basis for this exception. 
Finally, the County argues that it could not have 
violated any duty to negotiate its decision to change 
schedules because it had indicated its availability and 
willingness to do so. The record supports this proposition, 
but that availability and willingness occured after the 
unilateral change. Such availability and willingness would 
not authorize unilateral action unless the subject had been 
previously negotiated to impasse and the unilateral change 
3/ 
was made because of a compelling need.— This is not the 
case here. 
For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the 
decision of the ALJ, and WE ORDER that the charge herein be, 
and it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: May 8, 198 5 
Albany. New York 
Harped R. Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies. Member 
I/Cohoes CSD. 12 PERB 1[3113 (1979) 
Oft 
#2C-5/8/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF SCHENECTADY. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7597 
SCHENECTADY POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION. 
Charging Party. 
BUCHYN. O'HARE and WERNER. ESQS. (JOSEPH J. BUCHYN. 
Esq., of Counsel), for Respondent 
GRASSO & GRASSO, ESQS. (JANE FININ. ESQ.. of Counsel), 
for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City 
of Schenectady (City) to the decision of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) that it violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor 
Law in that it refused to negotiate the impact of a 
unilateral change. The unilateral change was the 
reduction below 14 of the number of patrolmen assigned to 
street duty during a police patrol shift. Although a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation, the City and the 
Schenectady Police Benevolent Association (PBA) have from 
Board - U-7597 
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time-to-time, included minimum manning clauses in past 
collective bargaining agreements. Moreover, the minimum 
manning standard of 14 patrolmen on street duty per shift 
was maintained by the City even when it was not covered by 
an agreement. 
FACTS 
When the parties' current agreement was being 
negotiated, the City indicated that it would not consent 
to the extension of a provision carried over from an 
earlier supplementary agreement for minimum manning.— 
Recognizing that the provision was not a mandatory subject 
of negotiation, PBA interposed no objection. It did, 
however, indicate its objection to the extension of a 
mandatory overtime clause contained in that supplementary 
agreement unless the minimum manning provision were 
I/The supplementary agreement, dated September 4, 1981, 
provided in pertinent part: 
14. Until December 31, 1981, and 
continuing thereafter, unless the City 
elects not to negotiate the matter 
which is recognized as a non-mandatory 
subject of bargaining . . . . [e]ach 
platoon shall have no less than 
fourteen patrolmen and one supervisor 
assigned for street duty. 
*- 9662 
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^ 2/ 
retained.— 
The mandatory overtime clause had been utilized by 
the City to compel off-duty police officers to fill in for 
absent regularly scheduled officers when an insufficient 
number of them volunteered for overtime work. The City 
informed PBA that it would not be able to maintain the 
minimum staffing levels without mandatory overtime, but 
PBA replied that it would oppose mandatory overtime unless 
minimum staffing were required by contract. The effect of 
this exchange between the parties is that the current 
.i/ln pertinent part, the supplementary agreement 
provides: 
15. The provisions of section 14 
above may require police officers to 
engage in overtime work to maintain 
the manning standards therein 
provided. Police officers may 
volunteer for such overtime work by 
submitting their names for overtime 
lists prepared for each grade or class 
of officer . . . Should canvassing of 
the voluntary over-time list not 
provide sufficient numbers to meet the 
above strengths, the least senior 
members otherwise qualified from said 
lists, shall be directed to work . . . 
16. It is expressly understood 
and agreed that sections 14 and 15 
a h n i r o g r o g k i a v c 1-n h a 1 r o a 1 - o r l 
together, and that section 15 shall be 
applicable only as long as section 14 
continues to be part of this contract 
or any successor contract. 
Ql 
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collective bargaining agreement contains neither a minimum 
staffing nor a mandatory overtime provision. 
Thereafter, there were at least two occasions when 
staffing fell below 14 per shift. On those occasions, the 
City had sought volunteers for overtime work, but had not 
been able to replace all the absentees. 
The situation giving rise to the charge was 
precipitated by a four-day PBA convention. May 14-17, 
1984. Eight unit employees attended and were therefore 
unavailable for work. Concerned about the "substantial 
increase in overtime costs" that would be required to find 
substitutes for all of them, the City's Mayor directed its 
Chief of Police not to fill all the openings. This was 
the first time that the City had made a conscious decision 
not to meet the past minimum staffing standard. PBA then 
issued a demand to the City that it negotiate the impact 
of this reduction in manpower. The City declined to enter 
into impact negotiations and PBA filed the charge herein. 
DISCUSSION 
The City's first argument is that the ALJ erred in 
finding that a minimum manning standard existed. 
Reviewing the record, we find that it did. We further 
find that the City changed its past practice regarding 
minimum manning and that, upon demand, it was required to 
negotiate the impact of the change with PBA. 
Board - U-7597 -5 
The more serious question raised by the City's 
exceptions is whether it had satisfied its duty to 
negotiate the impact of its change. It asserts that PBA 
initiated impact negotiations when it demanded that the 
mandatory overtime clause^bedeleted from the par 
agreement if the minimum staffing clause were deleted. It 
further asserts that this demand was negotiated and that 
PBA was successful in those negotiations. 
The record supports the proposition that PBA 
successfully demanded the termination of mandatory 
overtime unless the City consented to the extension of 
minimum manning. Thus, ordinarily, we would rule that the 
City satisfied its duty to negotiate the impact of its 
3/ . . 
actions.— A different conclusion, however, is required 
here. 
4/ . Chapter 360 of the Laws of 1911- specifies the 
maximum number of hours that may be assigned to police. 
On the face of this statute, police may not be assigned 
overtime work except under emergency conditions. Courts 
•^ /when a union confronted with a unilateral change 
submits impact demands, and those demands are negotiated to 
the point of settlement, the union is precluded from 
negotiating further impact demands until the expiration of 
the parties' agreement. Baldwinsville CSD. 15 PERB 1P032 
(1982). 
•^This session law appears in McKinney's 
Unconsolidated Laws, §971. 
Board - U-7597 
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have held that the statutory provisions notwithstanding 
"public employees, through their organizations, may 
bargain for and agree upon provisions for overtime as part 
5/ 
of the collective bargaining process."— This is 
because "[p]arties in voluntary agreement are not limited. 
except for rare matters contrary to public policy, from 
6 / 
agreeing to anything they wish."— Accordingly. 
employee benefits and protections may be waived in 
7/ 
collective negotiations.— 
While statutory overtime restrictions for police may 
be waived in collective negotiations, it does not follow 
that a police union can be compelled to negotiate a demand 
for such a waiver. Dealing with a different statutory 
protection for police and fire fighters, we have held that 
^./spring Valley PBA v. Village of Spring Valley. 80 
A.D.2d 910. 911. 14 PERB ir7515. at 7522 (2d Dept. 1981); 
Follett v. Seian. 123 Misc.2d 263. 17 PERB T7513 (Sup. Ct. 
Broome Co. 1984). 
^Mount St. Mary Hospital v. Catherwood, 2 6 N.Y.2d 
493. 507 (1970). 
2/Antinore v. State of New York. 29 A.D.2d 6. 8 PERB 
1f7513 (4th Dept. 1975). aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 921. 9 PERB ir7528 
V J. .. . W J . 
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a public employer's demand for a waiver of rights for paid 
8 / 
sick leave is not a mandatory subject of negotiation.— 
We find that there were discussions between the 
parties concerning minimum manning and mandatory overtime, 
but that these discussions did not constitute normal 
negotiations. The City merely stood upon its statutory 
right to require the termination of the minimum manning 
clause of the prior supplementary agreement because it 
involved a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. Similarly, 
PBA stood upon its statutory right to require the 
termination of the mandatory overtime clause of the prior 
supplementary agreement because it, too. involved a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiation. As this action of PBA 
did not constitute normal negotiations, we must reject the 
City's assertion that PBA had previously submitted and 
negotiated impact demands related to the City's unilateral 
action to an extent that would bar a later impact demand. 
It was therefore improper for the City to refuse to 
negotiate PBA's current impact demands. 
I/City of Binqhamton. 9 PERB ir3026 (1976). aff'd. 
City of Binqhamton v. Helsby. 9 PERB T7019 (Sup. Ct. Albany 
j£~ <^j 
Board - U-7597 
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NOW. THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the ALJ. and 
WE ORDER the City to: 
1. Negotiate, upon demand, the impact of 
its decision not to fill vacancies 
caused by employee absences during the 
period May 14-17, 1984; and 
2. Post a notice in the form attached at 
all places ordinarily used to convey 
information to unit employees. 
DATED: May 8. 1985 
Albany. New York 
^ii^2^/^^4dc. ^L^^<J^^^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
a v i d C. Randleis , Memhfer 
'*~' *-»' U 
APPENDIX 
NEW 
PUBLIC EMPLOYME 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
STAT 
RELAT 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the 
Schenectady Police Benevolant Association that the City will 
negotiate, upon demand, the impact of its decision not to fill 
vacancies caused by employee absences during the period May 14 -
17. 1984c 
CITY OF SCHENECTADY 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF KINGSTON. 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NO. U-7 932 
LOCAL #4 61 OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS. 
CITY OF KINGSTON. 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF KINGSTON, 
Employer. 
-and-
LOCAL #461 OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS. 
CITY OF KINGSTON, 
Employee Organization. 
LOMBARDI. REINHARD. WALSH & HARRISON, P.C. (RICHARD P. 
WALSH. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Local #461 of the 
International Association of Fire Fighters. City of 
Kingston 
ANDREW GILDAY. ESQ.. Corporation Counsel, for City of 
Kingston 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On January 4. 1985, the City of Kingston (City) 
petitioned for interest arbitration to resolve an impasse in 
negotiations with Local #461 of the International Association 
Q£7 
CASE NOS. IA84-31: 
M84-248 
Board - U-7932 & IA84-31; M84-248 -2 
of Fire Fighters. City of Kingston (Local #461). The 
negotiations were for an agreement to succeed one that had 
expired on December 31. 1983. It provided benefits involving 
nonmandatory subjects of negotiation. Apparently more 
i nt ere si:ed i n r eta ini ng thes e nonmanda t o ry benefits t han "in 
the potential new benefits that might be won at arbitration. 
Local #461 objected to the appointment of an arbitrator. 
On January 15. 1985. Local #461 filed the charge herein. 
It alleges that the City's mere filing of the petition 
constituted a violation of §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law 
because the employer could not alter the terms of an expired 
agreement, even if directed to do so by an arbitrator, unless 
there were a negotiated agreement.— The Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation dismissed the charge 
on the ground that it failed to allege facts constituting a 
violation. He did not consider whether or not §209-a.l(e) 
precludes a public employer from changing terms and conditions 
of employment pursuant to an arbitration award. Rather. 
i/The statute provides in pertinent part: 
It shall be an improper practice for a public 
employer or its agents deliberately . . . to refuse 
to continue all the terms of an expired agreement 
until a new agreement is negotiated . . . . 
Board - U-7932 & IA84-31; M84-248 -3 
he concluded that the mere filing of the petition does not 
make any such changes. 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Local #461 
2/ to that ruling.— It also comes to us on an appeal from a 
determinatxon of the Direc'for of Conciliation thathe would 
process the petition for interest arbitration. 
We affirm the decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation dismissing the 
improper practice charge. In City of Batavia Firefighters, 
17 PERB ir3007 (1984), we held that the mere filing of a 
petition for interest arbitration would not be improper even 
if a public employer could not abide by the arbitration 
award. Local #461 contends that Batavia is not applicable 
here because, in that case, the petition was filed by the 
union. That distinction is significant to the extent that we 
indicated in Batavia that the arbitration award would bind 
the union because, by petitioning for arbitration, it had 
consented to the process and thereby waived its right to 
stand on the expired agreement. However, the Batavia 
i/Local #461 also alleged that the City violated 
§209—a.1(d) bv including in its petition matters that had been 
resolved during the course of negotiations. The Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation dismissed the 
(d) specification on the ground that the charge contained no 
allegations of fact to support it. The exceptions do not 
address this matter. 
Board - U-7932 & IA84-31; M84-248 -4 
decision goes further than saying that a union which consents 
to the interest arbitration process is bound by whatever 
resolution emerges from that process. An alternative basis 
for our decision contemplated the absence of a valid consent. 
and we^saxd'Cat'p. 3014): ~ f : 
The problem for the employer would arise, if 
at all, only when the employer actually 
altered the terms of an expired agreement 
pursuant to such an arbitration award. 
It is this language that the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation properly applied here. 
Turning now to the determination of the Director of 
Conciliation that he would process the petition for interest 
arbitration, we address the question whether an award could 
authorize the City to change the terms of the parties' 
expired agreement. We considered this question in Batavia 
and, before that, in County of Niagara, 16 PERB 1f3071 
(1983). In Niagara, we held that absent a union's consent 
to the process, a public employer could not impose the terms 
of a legislative determination but was required to continue 
the terms of the parties' expired agreement until the 
negotiation of a new agreement. 
The rationale for our decision was based upon the 
legislative historv of §209—a.1(e). When it was first 
passed by the Legislature, many representatives of public 
employers urged the Governor to veto it because it would 
limit the role of local legislative bodies and arbitrators 
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in resolving negotiation deadlocks. Notwithstanding these 
representations, the Governor signed the bill. In doing so, 
he announced his intention to seek legislation that would 
provide: 
that the improper practice will be the 
refusal to continue all the terms of an 
expired agreement until a new agreement is 
negotiated or negotiations are resolved 
pursuant to the procedures established in 
section two hundred nine or pursuant to 
section two hundred twelve of Article 
14 1/ 
Such a bill was introduced at the request of the 
Governor during an extraordinary session of the Legislature 
in December 1982. The memorandum in support of this program 
) bill of the Governor stated: 
One clarification provided in the instant 
legislation provides for the recognition 
that a "new agreement" may be achieved 
through impasse procedures contained in 
section 209 of the Civil Service Law. 
Arbitration in police and fire impasse 
resolution and legislative hearings for 
other impasse resolutions can result in the 
achievement of new agreements which succeed 
an expired agreement. This legislation 
makes clear that an agreement achieved by 
such impasse processes supplants an expired 
agreement. (emphasis supplied) 
The bill was not passed in the form proposed by the 
Governor. On the contrary, language which referred to 
provisions of the Taylor Law that authorize legisiative 
•^Memorandum of Governor Carey upon approving L. 1982, c. 
868. McKinney's 1982 Session Laws, p. 2631, 2632. 
-„ 9674 
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determinations or interest arbitration was deleted. All that 
survived of the bill was language relieving a public employer 
of any obligation to abide by the terms of an expired 
agreement if the employee organization engaged in a strike. 
The Dir ect or of the Governor's Of flee of Employee 
Relations then recommended that this amendatory legislation be 
vetoed because it did not cure the defect in the original bill 
with respect to either "legislative hearing (CSL, §209.3) or 
interest arbitration (CSL. §§209.2, 209.4) . . . ." The 
Governor, nevertheless, signed the bill and it became law.— 
It is clear that legislative history which persuaded us 
that legislative determinations may not be imposed upon 
) 
unconsenting unions also applies to interest arbitration 
awards. Indeed, we said as much in footnote 9 of our Niagara 
decision. It provides, in pertinent part (at p. 3116): 
[A]n employee organization may consent to 
the issuance of a legislative determination 
by a legislative body or to a determination 
by a public arbitration panel, in which 
event it would waive its right to require 
the public employer to abide by the terms of 
the expired agreement. 
4/L. 1982. c. 921. 
58- %/D #0 
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) 
The Appellate Division. Fourth Department, affirmed our 
decision. County of Niagara v. Newman. 104 AD2d 1. 17 PERB 
1[7021 (4th Dep't. 1984). without mentioning arbitration. It 
said (at pp. 1-2): 
We notev fixst, that: ~~tri"e" simple language of 
the statute supports this construction. The 
amendment provides that the duty exists 
"until a new agreement is negotiated." 
Resolving an impasse by legislative action is 
not the same as negotiating an agreement 
We would add that resolving an impasse by interest arbitration 
. . 5/ 
is also not the same as negotiating an agreement.— 
Our analysis gives police and fire fighter unions the 
option of standing on prior agreements or invoking interest 
arbitration while denying a similar option to public 
employers. This follows from the legislation which inserted 
(e) in §209-a.l without inserting a parallel provision in 
§209-a.2. We conclude that (1) the mere filing of an arbitration 
petition is not an improper practice, but (2) the terms of an 
expired agreement may not be changed except by a subsequent 
negotiated agreement unless the union involved agrees to the 
submission of the deadlock for resolution by an arbitration 
award or a legislative determination. It follows that, as a 
5/see City of Mount Vernon, 5 PERB ir3057 (1972), in which 
this Board analogized a legislative determination to an 
arbitration award. 
- 9S76 
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matter of law, the arbitration process could be allowed to 
run its course up to, but not including, the point where the 
award is put into effect. That last step would be contingent 
upon Local #461's consent. 
WedeclineT to process the arbitration petition! under 
these circumstances. Our first reason for not permitting the 
arbitration process to run its course is that it would be 
futile to do so. The purpose of arbitration under §209.4 of 
the Taylor Law is to provide a final disposition of a 
negotiation deadlock. There is no substantial likelihood 
6 / that this would occur in the instant matter.— Our second 
reason is that it is unlikely that the arbitration panel 
could perform its work effectively. Local #461 could not 
be expected to present information or argument to the panel 
because its participation might constitute a waiver of its 
objection to the process. Finally, if the panel proceeded 
without Local #461's participation and issued an award. 
Local #461 would have an unfair advantage over the City by 
•^This would not be so if the City's petition for 
interest arbitration merely dealt with matters not covered by 
the expired agreement, and otherwise sought extension of that 
agreement. Compare Niagara County, supra, footnote 9. which 
^ L u v i u c b xu |JCL uxucut p a n . . 
[A] legislative body is still free to impose 
terms and conditions of employment not dealt 
with in the expired agreement. It may also 
impose the terms and conditions of employment 
contained in the prior agreement . . . . 
„. 9677 
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knowing the terms of the award before having to decide 
whether to be bound by it. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge in Case No. 
U-7932 be and it hereby is, dismissed. 
• ~ "- "-" '"""" and " " - ~ " : --------• 
WE REMAND Case Nos. M84-248/IA31 to the 
Director of Conciliation for further 
processing consistent with this 
decision. 
DATED: May 8. 1985 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GREECE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer/Petitioner. 
-and-
GREECE UNITED SUBSTITUTE TEACHERS 
ORGANIZATION. 
Intervenor. 
HARRIS. BEACH. WILCOX, RUBIN AND LEVEY. ESQS. 
(PETER J. SPINELLI. ESQ.. and BRIAN P. 
O'CONNOR. ESQ.. of Counsel), for Employer/ 
Petitioner 
JOHN J. MOODY, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The petition herein was filed by the Greece Central 
School District (District). It seeks to decertify the 
Greece United Substitute Teachers Organization (GUSTO) -
which had been certified on July 27. 1983. following an 
election - on the ground that GUSTO no longer represents a 
majority of the unit employees. The petition is opposed by 
GUSTO. 
The District and GUSTO had been in negotiations during 
the period between GUSTO'S certification and the District's 
petition, but no agreement was reached. The Director of 
' - 9R7Q 
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Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
ruled that this petition for decertification filed by a 
public employer before the parties have concluded their 
first collective bargaining agreement may not be entertained 
unless the public employer has demonstrated that it has 
"objectively reasonable grounds for believing that the 
incumbent union has lost its majority support." He found 
that the District did not have such "objectively reasonable 
grounds", and he dismissed the petition. The matter now 
comes to us on the District's exceptions. 
Our Rules of Procedure expressly specify the 
circumstances under which a petition for decertification may 
be filed. Two are relevant - but only peripherally so - to 
the instant proceeding. Rule 201.3(d) permits a petition 
for decertification during the "window period" before the 
expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. That 
"window period" is the thirty-day time frame immediately 
preceding the expiration of the period of unchallenged 
representation accorded by §208.2 of the Taylor Law to a 
recognized or certified employee organization. The rule 
provides that unless filed by a public employer, the 
petition shall be supported by a showing of interest. The 
clear implication of this rule is that such a petition may 
be filed by a public employer without either a showing of 
interest or other "objectively reasonable grounds". 
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Rule 201.3(e) permits for a petition 120 days after the 
expiration of a collective bargaining agreement so long as 
no new agreement has been executed. Such a petition may 
only be filed by an employee organization other than the one 
that was recognized or certified. Thus, if a public 
employer fails to file during the "window period" preceding 
the expiration of an agreement, it may not file thereafter 
until a new agreement is reached. The policy underlying 
Rule 201.3(e) is that the public employer should be under 
major pressure to conclude an agreement to succeed one that 
has expired, and it should not be able to evade this 
pressure by filing a petition. The potential problem of 
unit employees being represented by an employee organization 
that is no longer of their choosing may be remedied by an 
appropriate petition, but not one brought by the public 
employer. 
One other provision of our rules is relevant to the 
instant proceeding. Rule 201.3(g) provides: 
No petition may be filed for a unit which 
includes job titles that were within a unit 
for which, during the preceding twelve-month 
period, a petition was filed and processed to 
completion. 
It is implicit that some petitions may be filed once 
the twelve-month "certification bar" has run its course, 
but it does not follow that petitions for decertification 
may then be filed by a public employer. This rule was 
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primarily designed to assure stable relationships between 
public employers and their employees by barring new 
petitions for certification for a reasonable time after a 
former petition had been dismissed. Secondarily, it 
permits the filing of a petition for decertification under 
the same limited circumstances as one is permitted by Rule 
201.3(e), the reasons for the limitations being the same. 
Noting that our rules do not expressly provide for a 
petition for decertification by a public employer after 
the certification bar has expired and no contract has been 
negotiated, the Director ruled that such a petition could, 
nevertheless, be entertained. He imposed the "objectively 
reasonable grounds" requirement in the instant case on the 
basis of the rationale of the National Labor Relations 
Board in U.S. Gypsum Co.. 61 LRRM 1384 (1966). The public 
policy underlying that decision is that an employer 
disrupts the collective bargaining rights of a union by 
filing decertification petitions and therefore it should 
not be allowed to do so without good reason. 
The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of the 
District. It argues that U.S. Gypsum Co. is inapplicable 
in that the Board has established a different standard for 
permitting employer decertification petitions during the 
"window periods". It also argues that there is no logical 
reason why the policy considerations should be different 
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depending upon whether the petition is filed during a 
"window period" or after the expiration of the "election 
bar" period. It further argues that by requiring 
"objectively reasonable grounds for believing that the. 
'incumbent union hasriost"Its" majority support,r as" a 
condition for filing the petition, the Director was 
engaging in rule making, and the requirement must be set 
aside because the rule was not promulgated in accordance 
with the procedures prescribed in the Administrative 
Procedures Act. 
The District's next argument is that this Board 
rejected the "objectively reasonable grounds" test for the 
filing of a petition for decertification by a public 
employer in Hempstead UFSD. 7 PERB ir3017 (1974). Its 
final argument is that, in any event, it had submitted 
sufficient evidence to indicate that it had "objectively 
reasonable grounds" for its petition. 
As noted above, the filing of an employer's petition 
for decertification one year after certification of a 
union, but before the conclusion of an initial collective 
bargaining agreement, is more comparable to the filing of 
an employer's petition for decertification after 
expiration of a collective bargaining agreement but before 
»• 96 
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the conclusion of a successor agreement than it is to the 
filing of an employer's decertification petition during a 
"window period". It is therefore reasonable that our 
rules permit no employer petition for decertification in 
both situations when the parties are not subject to a 
collective bargaining agreement. 
We hold that the Director erred in determining that 
the District could file a petition one year after GUSTO'S 
certification when no collective bargaining agreement had 
been concluded. It is irrelevant whether the District had 
objectively reasonable grounds for filing its petition. 
Indeed, as noted by the District, the Director's action 
constituted a supplementation of our rules.— However, 
that supplementation was not merely the requiring of 
"objectively reasonable grounds" but also the permitting 
of the petition even with "objectively reasonable grounds" 
For this reason we find it unnecessary to consider 
the District's further arguments, the petition not being 
timely in any event. 
1/Cf. Albany Housing Authority. 7 PERB ir4017 (1974); 
decertification was ordered. 7 PERB ir3018 (1974). without 
any issue regarding the merits of the matter being raised 
before us. 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the petition herein be, 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 8. 1985 
Albany. New York 
H<U6^y( 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
mr <j 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROME CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT CASE NO. E-llll 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons- as Managerial or Confidential, 
HANCOCK & ESTABROOK. ESQS. (JAMES P. BURNS. 3rd. ESQ. 
and ELLETTA SANGREY CALLAHAN, ESQ.. of Counsel), 
for the District 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Rome City School District (District) to a decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director). In his decision the Director 
granted the District's application to designate two of 
its clerical employees confidential in accordance with 
the criteria set forth in §201.7(a) of the Taylor Law. 
The exceptions indicate that the District is not 
satisfied with the Director's decision; it asserts that 
the decision should have designated not only the two 
clerical employees referred to in its application as 
confidential but also their "successors so long as the 
job assignments and responsibilities remain the same". 
) 
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The above-quoted language was included in our 
designation in Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of New York, 10 PERB ir3024 
(1977). However, the situation there was different. 
In that case, there had been aturnover in positions 
covered by the application during the period between 
the filing of the application with respect to named 
employees and the decision of the Director. 
Accordingly, the decision applied to successors already 
at work. 
Even though the above decision is not precedent 
for language such as that sought by the District, there 
is a.question whether such language is required. We 
hold that it is not. In City of White Plains. 18 PERB 
1f303l (1985), which we have issued today, we have held 
that successor employees are covered by a managerial or 
confidential designation even without such language so 
long as their duties are identical with those 
originally found to support the original designation. 
The language sought by the District is therefore 
redundant. 
9687 
Board - E-llll -3 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the exceptions herein 
be, and they hereby are. dismissed. 
DATED: May-8. 19 8 5 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
^•M. 
David C. Randies, Membe 
~*r *.» Xi 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LAKE PLACID VILLAGE. INC., 
Employer. 
and- CASE- NO.- -G--2-&9-9 
TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 648, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
LAKE PLACID POLICE UNIT. ESSEX COUNTY 
LOCAL. CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION. INC.. LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. 
AFL-CIO. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters. Local 648 has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. g-» 
•sr ^j\ 
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Unit: Included: All police officers. 
Excluded: Chief of Police and all other employees. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate co II ec t Ive ly wi th the Teams ters". Locar 6 48""and 
enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment of the 
employees in the above unit, and shall negotiate collectively 
with such employee organization in the determination of, and 
administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: May 8, 1985 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman-
David C. RandleSs, Memb 
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